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Consumer Law, Class Actions, and the 
Common Law 
Michael S. Greve* 
I. INTRODUCTION 
Even where bodies of law purport to be defined by their 
subject matter, such as ìhealth care lawî or ìhousing law,î they 
are often distinguished from legal arrangements covering the 
same area by their underlying presumptions.  ìEmployment law,î 
for instance, covers substantially the same economic transactions 
as the older labor law and still-older common law doctrines.  
Those fields differ chiefly in their premises, and consequently, 
their institutional arrangements.  Unlike labor law, which is 
principally the law of labor unions and their rights and relations 
vis-‡-vis management (under the auspices of the National Labor 
Relations Board), employment law is individualistic.  With few 
exceptions, the right to remain free from discrimination is the 
individual employeeís, and it can be enforced outside union 
channels and arbitration regimes.1  In that respect, employment 
law resembles the old common law of contract and employment 
at will, but with a twist.  Instead of a fundamental, bilateral 
freedom not to deal, employment law establishes the employeeís 
unilateral right to remain free from discriminatory treatment.2  
This antidiscrimination principle permits the employee to press 
the employer into transactions that they would rather avoid, all 
things considered.3  The purported extension of common law 
rights masks their redistribution. 
In a similar way, ìconsumer lawî is parasitic on, and 
transformative of, common law doctrines grounded in contract 
 
* Ph.D. (Government), Cornell University, 1987.  I am indebted to Kate Rick for her 
capable research assistance and to Richard Epstein, Robert Gasaway, Michael Kelly, 
Jonathan Klick, George Priest, and David Rosenberg for exceptionally helpful suggestions 
and comments on earlier drafts. 
 1 That, of course, was the point: seniority rules and other labor union practices often 
worked to the disadvantage of minority employees.  See, e.g., Martin v. Wilks, 490 U.S. 
755, 758-59 (1989). 
 2 See RICHARD A. EPSTEIN, FORBIDDEN GROUNDS: THE CASE AGAINST EMPLOYMENT 
DISCRIMINATION LAWS 3 (1992). 
 3 Id. at 5, 73. 
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and tort.  While unknown before the 1970s, modern ìconsumer 
lawî does not govern a single transaction that is not also covered 
by traditional common law doctrines.  However, where tort law 
required an actual injury as an essential element of a cause of 
action; consumer law dispenses with that requirement and others 
like it, such as inducement and detrimental reliance.4  Where the 
common law matched the sellerís duty to steer clear of fraud and 
misrepresentation with the contractual principle of ìbuyer 
beware,î consumer law substitutes a unilateral duty of disclosure 
on the seller.5 
My point in highlighting these differences is not to argue for 
the superiority of common law rules over consumer law 
constructs. I will stipulate that mandatory disclosure rules may 
be efficient in some settings.  For purposes at hand, I will even 
concedeóalthough I frankly doubtóthat a full-fledged consumer 
law regime might, at a highly abstract and theoretical level, be 
shown to be just as efficient as an equally stylized common law 
regime.  Rather, my point is that it makes no sense to have the 
two regimes operate on top of each other and over the same range 
of transactions. However, that is the system we now have.  Just 
as employment law was superimposed on the pre-existing regime 
of contractual employment obligations, so too has consumer law 
been piggybacked on top of common law doctrines governing the 
promotion and sale of goods and services.  This dual regime is 
extremely unlikely to enhance social welfare or even consumer 
interests.6 
II. DEVELOPMENT OF CONSUMER LAW 
Handbooks and treatises on ìconsumer lawî often define it as 
a contradistinction to commercial law, meaning the law 
governing transactions among merchants.7  The common law, of 
 
 4 See, e.g., The Honorable Sheldon Gardner & Robert Kuehl, Acquiring an 
Historical Understanding of Duties to Disclose, Fraud, and Warranties, 104 COM L.J. 168, 
186-88 (1999). 
 5 Id. at 178-79. 
 6 In commenting on an earlier draft, David Rosenberg has forcefully reminded me 
that redundant, competing systems of law may be very useful for a number of reasons, 
such as information discovery and a reduction of the frequency and cost of error.  To that 
extent, the dual system problem dissolves into a coordination problem.  This is the correct 
perspective.  The central coordination problem to my mind is this: redundancy has 
salutary effects so long as in any given case or transaction, each system operates to the 
exclusion of the other.  In such a case, the parties and their disputes can migrate from one 
to the other and the systems check each other at the margin.  However, consumer law and 
common law rarely operate in this competitive sense of ìredundancy.î  They operate 
jointly, which is bound to compound errors.  Even compound errors, one might argue, 
generate information, but they are unlikely to generate useful operational information at 
an acceptable cost. 
 7 See MICHAEL M. GREENFIELD, CONSUMER LAW: A GUIDE FOR THOSE WHO 
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course, made no such distinction; it rested on a robust, across-
the-board presumption in favor of freedom of contract.8  Even the 
Uniform Commercial Code (ìUCCî) treats consumer transactions 
under the same rules that apply to comparable business 
transactions.9  However, consumer law theorists and advocates 
insist that the assumptions that underpin freedom of contract 
simply do not apply in the context of consumer transactions.  
Using often-colorful language, consumer lawyers conjure up a 
world of ignorant, impulsive consumers who stumble helplessly 
through a world of serial monopolies.10  In soberer moments, they 
identify the characteristics that supposedly distinguish consumer 
markets: asymmetric information (or wholesale consumer 
ignorance), unequal bargaining power, and irrational consumer 
preferences.11  Consumer protection laws attempt to redress 
these problems by imposing affirmative disclosure obligations12 
through outright prohibitions on abusive, extortionate, or 
unconscionable contract terms and sales practices,13 or through 
mandatory cooling-off or revocation periods.14 
All these rationalizations prove either too much or too little 
to define the discrete field of ìconsumer law.î  Information is 
asymmetric in business as well as consumer transactions (the 
seller almost always knows more than the buyer); still, for good 
reasons, the general rule remains ìbuyer beware.î  Bargaining 
power is often unequal in the business sector, but within the 
general framework of protections against fraud and monopoly, we 
let the parties deal, or not deal, as they wish.  Evidence of 
 
REPRESENT SELLERS, LENDERS, AND CONSUMERS 2 (1995); FREDERICK H. MILLER ET AL., 
CONSUMER LAW: CASES, PROBLEMS, AND MATERIALS 3 (1998). 
 8 See Charles L. Knapp, Taking Contracts Private: The Quiet Revolution in Contract 
Law, 71 FORDHAM L. REV. 761, 769 n.33 (2002). 
 9 Even with respect to such consumer law chestnuts as unconscionability and 
warranties, the UCC makes no distinction between merchants and consumers.  See 
U.C.C. ßß 2-302, 2-312 to 2-317 (1997 & Supp. 2003).  The UCC did contain a few rare 
distinctions between consumers and businesses, which have been repealed.  See, e.g., 
U.C.C. ßß 9-505, 9-507 (repealed 1999). 
 10 Even casebooks display that tendency: in consumer transactions, ìthe position of 
the parties is such that the consumer is faced with a take-it-or-leave-it proposition, and 
often few alternative sources of supply offering any substantially different deal.î  MILLER 
ET AL., supra note 7, at 4. 
 11 Id. at 3-4; Lary Lawrence, Toward a More Efficient and Just Economy: An 
Argument for Limited Enforcement of Consumer Promises, 48 OHIO ST. L.J. 815, 817, 824-
25 (1987). 
 12 See, e.g., Real Estate Settlement Procedures Act of 1974, 12 U.S.C. ß 2601 (2001) 
(commonly referred to as ìRESPAî); Securities Act of 1933, 15 U.S.C. ßß 77a-77aa (1997); 
Truth in Lending Act, 15 U.S.C. ß1601 (1998); Magnuson-Moss Warranty Act, 15 U.S.C. ß 
2302 (1998); 12 C.F.R. ß 18.4 (2003). 
 13 See, e.g., Fair Debt Collection Practices Act, 15 U.S.C. ß 1692 (1998); 16 C.F.R. ßß 
310.4, 453.2-453.3 (2003); 47 C.F.R. ß 64.1200 (2002). 
 14 See, e.g., Truth in Lending Act, 15 U.S.C. ß 1635 (1998) (establishing right for 
consumeróbut not lending institutionóto revoke mortgage contract within three days 
without penalty); 16 C.F.R. ß 429.1 (2003). 
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pervasive irrationality is far too conjectural at this point to 
warrant careless paternalism; at most, it may justify circumspect 
interventions that protect the irrational from costly mistakes 
without, in the same process, inflicting costs on the rational.15 
There is no set of criteria or principles that reliably 
delineates a discrete ìconsumer law,î and, in truth, the attempt 
to conjure up such a body of law partook of a broader, explicitly 
ideological reform movement.  Beginning in the 1960s, large 
numbers of policy advocates and legal scholars argued that 
common law forms and formalities were an impediment to social 
reform, the effective management of public problems, and the 
aspirations and interests of deserving political constituencies.16  
At its zenith, this critique became distilled in an ambitious effort 
to develop a full-blown theory of ìpublic law,î a term that has 
since lost currency.17  The venue for the most serious and 
thoroughgoing version of this argument was environmental law, 
whose champions claimed that environmental complexities 
rendered common law distinctions between ìmine and thineî ìa 
menace to an imperiled planet.î18  In an interconnected world, 
human activities become per se externalities.19  Thus, when an 
endangered woodpecker decides to build its nest where you 
decide to build your house, the bird wins and you lose.20  
 
 15 See Colin Camerer et al., Regulation for Conservatives: Behavioral Economics and 
the Case for ìAsymmetric Paternalism,î 151 U. PA. L. REV. 1211, 1212-14 (2003).  Note 
also that this rationale would often appear to dictate regulatory strategies that are 
diametrically opposed to actually existingóand well-nigh sacrosanctóìconsumer 
protections.î  Disclosure obligations for public corporations and broker-dealers, for 
example, are loudly touted as protections for the proverbial ìsmall investor.î  Even if 
equity markets are approximately efficient, the vast majority of those investors should not 
dabble in the market; they should buy index funds.  Merrill Lynch and its ilk complied 
with every applicable regulation, which did nothing to prevent unsophisticated consumers 
from entering a bubbly market.  By taking those investors as the yardstick, disclosure 
regulation creates a moral hazard (a kind of deposit insurance for stock market 
amateurs), while distorting or suppressing information (such as forward-looking 
information) that would be of use to more sophisticated investors.  Arguably, an efficient 
paternalistic regime would license stock buyers, not brokers.  See Stephen J. Choi & 
Andrew T. Guzman, Portable Reciprocity: Rethinking the International Reach of Securities 
Regulation, 71 S. CAL. L. REV. 903, 941-43 (1998). 
 16 See generally, Charles Reich, The New Property, 73 YALE L.J. 733 (1964) (arguing 
for the expansion of property rights to government entitlements). 
 17 See generally RONALD DWORKIN, LAWíS EMPIRE (1986); Abram Chayes, The Role of 
the Judge in Public Law Litigation, 89 HARV. L. REV. 1281 (1976); Owen M. Fiss, The 
Supreme Court 1978 TermñForeward: The Forms of Justice, 93 HARV. L. REV. 1 (1979); 
Cass R. Sunstein, Beyond the Republican Revival, 97 YALE L. J. 1539 (1988). 
 18 MICHAEL S. GREVE, THE DEMISE OF ENVIRONMENTALISM IN AMERICAN LAW 1 
(1996). 
 19 See A. Dan Tarlock, The Nonequilibrium Paradigm in Ecology and the Partial 
Unraveling of Environmental Law, 27 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 1121, 1125 (1994) (noting that all 
human activities produce negative externalities). 
 20 Brian Mannix, The Origin of Endangered Species and the Descent of Man, AM. 
ENTERPRISE, Nov.ñDec. 1992, at 58, 58.  This paradigm continues to appear in the case 
law.  See, e.g., Natíl Assoc. of Home Builders v. Babbitt, 130 F.3d 1041, 1052-54 (D.C. Cir. 
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Environmental lawís ambition of managing entire ecosystems in 
accordance with a coherent political scheme rests on a full-scale 
repudiation of the common law and its theoretical foundations, 
including notions of property, harm, and individual injury.21 
Consumer law advocates could rest their case, at least 
initially, on a more modest critique of the common law and of a 
market economy.  Affirmative disclosure obligations, they argue, 
would make for more informed consumers and hence better 
customers.22  Such obligations would improve rather than stifle 
competition.23  Unlike environmental law, consumer law remains 
at least superficially tied to production values.24  Similarly, 
consumer law advocates need not attack the common law at its 
roots; they can plausibly rest their case on the enforcement 
problems and transaction costs that attend common law 
litigation.  Those barriers, the argument runs, may prevent the 
victims of wrongful conduct from asserting their claims when, as 
is often the case in consumer transactions, those claims are 
small.25  The costs of detecting and proving unlawful conductó
for example, in cases of fraud, which require proof of the 
defendantís knowing and intentional misrepresentationómay 
further exacerbate a tendency towards under-enforcement and 
under-deterrence.  That is especially so when even the full 
enforcement of the available remedies, such as damages under 
the out-of-pocket rule, leave a lawbreaking defendant no worse 
off (net of the costs of defending the claims) than his law-abiding 
competitor.26 
This thoroughly familiar argument suggests equally familiar 
remedies.  An obvious choice is to entrust public agencies with 
 
1997) (holding that the Federal Endangered Species Act passes constitutional muster 
under the Commerce Clause due to the interconnectedness of the world). 
 21 Greve, supra note 18, at 6-7. 
 22 See, e.g., Truth in Lending Act, 15 U.S.C. ß 1601 (1998); Magnuson-Moss 
Warranty Act, 15 U.S.C. ß 2302 (1998). 
 23 See, e.g., 15 U.S.C. ßß 1601, 2302. 
 24 The unfair competition laws that were to become a principal vehicle for the 
creation of ìconsumer law,î see, e.g., MILLER ET AL., supra note 7, at 5-6, were originally 
enacted to protect competitors and competition rather than consumers.  The Federal 
Trade Commission Act of 1915 was amended to protect consumer interests after the 
Supreme Court ruled that the original statute protected competitors exclusively.  See FTC 
v. Raladam Co., 283 U.S. 643, 653 (1931); Federal Trade Commission Act, 15 U.S.C. ß 41 
(1914), amended by 15 U.S.C.ß 45(a)(1) (1938).  Californiaís Unfair Competition Law, far 
and away the most draconian consumer statute in the nation, originated as a statute to 
protect competition and to this day is viewed as embodying that objective.  See Robert C. 
Fellmeth, Unfair Competition Act Enforcement by Agencies, Prosecutors, and Private 
Litigants: Whoís on First?, 15 CAL. REG. L. REP. 1, 2-3 (1995). 
 25 See Fellmeth, supra note 24, at 4 (ìOne public price paid is a barrier to entry to 
one who has, in fact, a product or service many would greatly desireóif they could believe 
claims made about it.î). 
 26 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS ß 549 cmt. g (1977). 
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the definition and enforcement of prohibitions and injunctions 
against unfair or fraudulent business practices, without having 
to prove the common law elements of such violations.  Another 
strategy, albeit a crude one, is to increase the rewards for private 
enforcers.  A third strategy, running roughly concurrent with the 
invention of consumer law, is the bundling of small claims in 
class actions.  While all three strategies predate the invention of 
modern consumer law by more than a half-century,27 their use 
increased enormously during the 1970s when Congress and state 
legislatures enacted a rash of consumer protection statutes and 
damages provisions.28  As a result, jury awards proliferated.29  
Also, in the wake of the 1966 class action reforms, federal and 
state courts created a novel and remarkably permissive regime 
for the prosecution and adjudication of mass claims.30 
That prompt accommodation to perceived consumer needs 
failed to create an equilibrium where consumer law has come to 
rest.  It is exceedingly difficult to tailor private rewards to 
deterrence objectives, and, in any event, their effectiveness still 
depends on the availability of a sufficiently large plaintiff class.  
Public consumer protection agencies, even when run by consumer 
advocates,31 still operate under budgetary constraints and 
countervailing political pressures.  Modern class actions are 
fraught with a wide array of problems, including substantial 
transaction costs and sweetheart settlements or ìreverse 
auctionsî that dilute the deterrent value of such actions.32  
 
 27 See, e.g. Clayton Act, 15 U.S.C. ß 15 (1914) (treble damages for antitrust 
violations); Federal Trade Commission Act, 15 U.S.C. ß 41 (1914) (authorizing the Federal 
Trade Commission to regulate unfair or deceptive acts in business commerce), amended 
by 15 U.S.C. ß 45(a)(1); Martin Act of 1921, N.Y. GEN BUS. LAW ßß 352-359 (McKinney 
1996 & Supp. 2003) (regulating investment security sales in New York and requiring 
brokers, advisors, etc. to register with the New York Attorney Generalís office). 
 28 Jeff Sovern, Private Actions Under the Deceptive Trade Practices Acts: 
Reconsidering the FTC Act as Rule Model, 52 OHIO ST. L.J. 437, 446 (1991) [hereinafter 
Sovern, Reconsidering]. 
 29 Id. 
 30 Apparently, the Civil Rules Advisory Committee had no such goal in mind.  See 
Class Action Reform Gets a Shot in the Arm, 69 DEF. C. J. 263, 264 (2002) (ìProfessor 
Arthur Miller, who was involved with the work of the committee at that time, tells us that 
ëNothing was in the committeeís mind . . . .  And the rule was not thought of as having the 
kind of application that it now has.íî). 
 31 During the 1970s, leaders of Ralph Naderís consumer organizations assumed 
high-ranking government positions: Joan Claybrook ran the National Highway Traffic 
Safety Administration and Michael Pertschuk the Federal Trade Commission. 
 32 The latter practice has prompted intense academic debate and a broad range of 
reform proposals.  See, e.g., John C. Coffee, Jr., Class Action Accountability: Reconciling 
Exit, Voice, and Loyalty in Representative Litigation, 100 COLUM. L. REV. 370 (2000); 
Bruce L. Hay & David Rosenberg, ìSweetheartî and ìBlackmailî Settlements in Class 
Actions: Reality and Remedy, 75 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1377 (2000); Samuel Issacharoff, 
Governance and Legitimacy in the Law of Class Actions, 1999 SUP. CT. REV. 337, 341-42 
(1999). 
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Besides, consumer law itself creates a kind of upward demand 
spiral.  Confronted with a prohibition against competition on 
some margin (for example, interest rates on consumer loans or 
mortgages), sellers will compete on some other, less transparent 
margin, thus creating demands for additional interventions.33  If 
more laws and affirmative obligations, bigger government 
agencies with bigger enforcement budgets, and better incentives 
for injured consumers do not do the job, the natural move is to 
mimic environmental law after all: divorce lawfulness from 
individual harm, legal claims from their common law owners, 
and legal theories from production values.  In fact, the law has 
moved on this trajectory.  Its chief propellant has been the 
consumer class action.  A simple example, based loosely on an 
actual case that eventually settled for a modest $2.1 billion, 
illustrates the progression. 34 
III. CONSUMER LAW CLASS ACTIONS 
Suppose a company sells a large number of identical 
computers at a price of $1,000 with an implied or actual promise 
that the product will function flawlessly. Unfortunately, it turns 
out that a series of complex operations performed by only a small 
number of marginal consumers causes the system to crash.  
What is the sensible assignment of rights? 
The common law rule, in a nutshell, is to deter negligent 
misrepresentation or simple mistake by means of providing 
redress for those persons, and only those persons, who have 
suffered an injury and who justifiably relied on the 
manufacturerís representations.35  Under the out-of-pocket rule, 
redress includes restitution for the full purchase price minus the 
residual value of the product, if any.36  It also includes the userís 
 
 33 The literature on banking and consumer loan regulation has amply documented 
the phenomenon. See, e.g., Christopher C. DeMuth, The Case Against Credit Card Interest 
Rate Regulation, 3 YALE J. ON REG. 201 (1986); Todd J. Zywicki, The Economics of Credit 
Cards, 3 CHAP. L. REV. 79, 82-83 (2000).  In the area of subprime mortgage lending, 
consumer advocates are pressingóboth at the state and the federal levelófor the 
regulation of opaque loan terms whose use was very likely induced by earlier rounds of  
ìconsumer protectionî legislation, in particular de facto usury ceilings.  See Michael S. 
Greve, Subprime, but not Half-Bad: Mortgage Regulation as a Case Study in Preemption, 
FEDERALIST OUTLOOK Sept.-Oct. 2003, at 1, available at http://www.aei.org/publications/
contentID.20038142219500221/default.asp. 
 34 Shaw v. Toshiba Am. Info. Sys., Inc., 91 F. Supp. 2d 926 (E.D. Tex. 1999); Andy 
Pasztor & Peter Landers, Toshiba to Pay $2B Settlement on Laptops, WALL ST. J. ONLINE, 
Oct. 31, 1999, available at http://zdnet.com.com/2100-11-516294.html. 
 35 In addition, a plaintiff must show that the representation was in fact false and 
made with the intent of inducing the plaintiff to rely on it.  37 AM. JUR. 2D Fraud and 
Deceit ß 26 (2001); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS ß 552 (1977).  Of course, pleading 
and proof requirements for the historically disfavored tort of fraud are still more 
demanding.  See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS ß 526 cmt. b (1977). 
 36 Id. ß 552B. 
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opportunity costs (the foregone benefits of purchasing a 
competing, flawless product).37  It appears that most courts also 
award quasi-contractual, benefit-of-the-bargain redress for the 
consumerís disappointed expectations.38  Marginal consumers 
who satisfy the dual requirements of detrimental reliance receive 
full compensation, and the infra-marginal consumers for whom 
the product worked as promised receive nothing. 
The alternative is to ask what legal regime individuals 
would choose ex anteóthat is, prior to the purchase or use of this 
or any other product.  The answer, some scholars have argued, is 
a rule that creates adequate deterrence for the manufacturer to 
optimally investment in precautionary measures.39  On the 
additional assumption that individuals are risk-averse, the rule 
will also provide full insurance coverage for all economic losses.  
However, the rule will not provide compensation in excess of the 
insured amounts, for example, compensation for non-pecuniary 
losses.40  This is bad news for consumer-plaintiffs from an ex post, 
wealth-maximizing perspective. 
The good news is that from a deterrence-oriented, ex ante 
perspective, common law considerations of injury, inducement, 
and justifiable reliance are beside the point and quite probably 
harmful.  Those questions go only to the distribution of the 
proceeds, which is separate from and secondary to the 
determination of the correct deterrence level.41  To be sure, if 
damages are set at the right level litigation by the marginal 
consumers may produce a deterrence level that will generate 
optimal investments in precautions.  But why should we rely on 
those consumers and their uncertain incentives to extract the 
sellerís windfall?  It may make more sense to round up the 
purchasers all along the demand curve and figure out the 
difference between the purchase price and the price that 
consumers would have paid in the aggregate had the true 
characteristics of the product been known. 
 
 
 37 See id. 
 38 In other words, courts do not attempt to restore the plaintiff to the position that 
he would have occupied had the misrepresentation never been made; they attempt to put 
him into the position he would have occupied, had the false communication been true.  Id. 
ß 549 cmt. g (criticizing the practice but acknowledging its preponderance); Michael B. 
Kelly, The Phantom Reliance Interest in Tort Damages, 38 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 169, 170-71 
(2001). 
 39 CHARLES FRIED & DAVID ROSENBERG, MAKING TORT LAW: WHAT SHOULD BE DONE 
AND WHO SHOULD DO IT 18-20 (2003). 
 40 See id. at 13-26 (describing this perspective in a non-technical manner). 
 41 See generally David Rosenberg, Decoupling Deterrence and Compensation 
Functions in Mass Tort Class Actions for Future Loss, 88 VA. L. REV. 1871 (2002) 
[hereinafter Rosenberg, Decoupling Deterrence and Compensation]. 
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Increasing numbers of class actions, including some cases of 
considerable notoriety, proceed from this premise only to push 
towards a rather more insidious conclusion.  A few examples 
illustrate the pattern: 
Williams v. Purdue Pharma Co.42 was a class action on 
behalf of purchasers of OxyContin, a potent opioid.43  The 
plaintiffs complained that Purdue conducted a deceptive, 
misleading, and fraudulent advertising campaign that falsely 
stated the product would provide ìsmooth and sustained pain 
relief,î and posed little risk of addiction when used as 
prescribed.44  The class plaintiffs did not claim that the product 
failed to work as advertised for them or that they became 
addicted.45  Instead, they argued that they were deprived of the 
full benefit of their purchase bargain because the product failed 
to work as advertised for some other consumers.46 
In Avery v. State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Co.,47 
an Illinois jury and judge awarded $1.18 billion to a class of an 
estimated 4.5 million State Farm customers in forty-eight states.  
This award was based upon the companyís post-crash repair cost 
estimates on the basis of cheap and allegedly inferior 
aftermarket parts.48  Plaintiffs did not allege that State Farmís 
policy, which many states encourage or even require to control 
automobile insurance rates, caused them physical injury or 
consequential pecuniary losses such as lost resale value.49  
Instead, they prevailed on the claim that aftermarket parts are 
inherently inferior and therefore fail to satisfy State Farmís 
contractual obligations to restore vehicles to their pre-loss 
condition.50 
In Price v. Philip Morris Inc.,51 another Illinois state court 
approved a $10.1 billion verdict in favor of a class of Illinois 
purchasers and consumers of Marlboro Lights and Cambridge 
Lights.52  The action did not include claims for personal injury.53  
Rather, plaintiffs claimed that the advertisements of the 
 
 42 297 F. Supp. 2d 171 (D.D.C. 2003). 
 43 Id. at 172, 175. 
 44 Id. at 172-73. 
 45 Id. at 172. 
 46 Id. at 175-76 (summarizing plaintiffsí complaint). 
 47 746 N.E.2d 1242 (Ill. App. Ct. 2001). 
 48 Id. at 1247.  The court subsequently reduced the judgment by $130 million.  Id. at 
1261.  The case is pending on appeal to the Illinois Supreme Court.  Avery v. State Farm 
Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 786 N.E.2d 180 (Ill. 2002). 
 49 746 N.E.2d at 1258. 
 50 Id. at 1259. 
 51 No. 00-L-112, 2003 WL 22597608 (Ill. Cir. Ct. Mar. 21, 2003). 
 52 Id. at *29. 
 53 Id. at *3. 
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products as ìLightsî and ìLowered Tar and Nicotineî were 
deceptive, unfair, and calculated to create the false consumer 
impression that the products were safer or less harmful than 
regular cigarettes.54  Plaintiffs claimed to have overpaid in 
reliance on these misrepresentations.55  They sought and 
obtained damages for the difference between the purchase price 
and the value of the product that they actually received.56  The 
trial judge credited a consumer survey conducted by a plaintiffís 
expert, which estimated the diminution in value at 92.3 percent, 
and on that basis arrived at ìcompensatoryî class damages of 
$7.1 billion.57 
Quite obviously, ordinary notions of detrimental reliance and 
inducement play a distinctly subordinate role in those cases; 
otherwise, it is hard to see how a court could possibly certify 
inchoate classes of consumers who vary greatly in their degree of 
reliance and injury (if any).58  From the ex ante perspective, these 
differences are immaterial.  The right rule will skim off the 
entire surplus of the transaction (both the producer and 
consumer surplus), which the inframarginal consumers, for 
whom the products worked as advertised, have already received 
and will get to keep in any event.  The rule will provide full 
insurance compensation for the consumer class and distribute 
the remaining funds (if any) to someone else, for some other 
ìpublic use.î59 
 
 54 Id. at *4. 
 55 Id. at *15. 
 56 Price, 2003 WL 22597606, at *15. 
 57 Id. at *16ñ17. 
 58 The nationwide class certified in Avery is highly problematic in many respects.  It 
could not possibly be sustained in the Seventh Circuit, which covers Illinois.  See In re 
Bridgestone/Firestone, Inc., 288 F.3d 1012, 1018 (7th Cir. 2002) (ìBecause these claims 
must be adjudicated under the law of so many jurisdictions, a single nationwide class is 
not manageable.î), cert. denied, 537 U.S. 1105 (2003).  Due to the requirement of complete 
diversity, however, the case could not be removed to federal court.  State Farmís repeated 
attempts to have the class decertified in state court and an interlocutory petition for 
certiorari to the U.S. Supreme Court remained unsuccessful.  State Farm v. Speroni, 525 
U.S. 922 (1998) (denying certiorari); Avery v. State Farm, 746 N.E. 2d 1242, 1257 (Ill. 
App. Ct. 2001) (affirming class certification). 
 59 See Rosenberg, Decoupling Deterrence and Compensation, supra note 41, at 1896.  
The cheerful ìpublic useî appellation conceals grave problems at both ends of the 
transaction.  It suggests that the ìpublic useî is ipso facto superior to the producerís 
ìprivateî useóincluding, presumably, the production of future goods or services.  In this 
regard, the purveyors of an ex ante regime leave themselves open to the charge of playing 
in a static world.  That problem is aggravated when the ìpublic useî of the ìexcessî is 
handed over, as often it is, to a private organization with the stated objective of siphoning 
off the next producerís surplus.  See James R. McCall et al., Greater Representation for 
California ConsumersóFluid Recovery, Consumer Trust Funds, and Representative 
Actions, 46 HASTINGS L. J. 797, 848 (1995) (ìThe consumer trust fund created by the 
courtís order in Avco funded . . . [cases involving issues of concern to] low and moderate 
income consumers in California . . . .î).  See also Price, 2003 WL 22597608, at *49ñ50 
(awarding unclaimed funds to the Illinois Bar Foundation, eleven law schools, the 
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Like traditional common law plaintiffs, the members of the 
plaintiff classes just described at least purchased OxyContin, 
insurance policies, and Marlboro Lights, and did complain about 
the characteristics of those products and the sellersí 
representations. But if we are worried chiefly about deterrence 
levels, those limitations may be superfluous.  Perhaps, anyoneó
bystander, malcontent, plaintiffsí lawyer, public prosecutoró
should be permitted to sue and recover, so long as we rely on 
courts to generate optimal deterrence levels. 
Modern ìentrepreneurialî class actions, which are instigated 
and controlled entirely by plaintiffsí lawyers, conform to this 
pattern.60  Statutory law has moved in the same direction.  Most 
prominently, Californiaís Unfair Competition Law (ìUCLî)61 
prohibits ìany unlawful, unfair or fraudulent business act or 
practice and unfair, deceptive, untrue or misleading 
advertising.î62  ìUnlawfulî acts are those that are unlawful under 
any statute; hence, the UCL sweeps across the entire California 
Code, including the criminal code.63  Moreover, compliance with 
the law is not necessarily a defense since business practices that 
are not ìunlawfulî may still be ìunfair.î64 
The extraordinary breadth of the UCL is matched by the 
liberality of its enforcement provisions.  The act may be enforced 
by state and local prosecutors and by literally any private party 
acting ìfor the interests of itself, its members or the general 
public.î65  Anyone can sue anyone else; the only standing 
 
American Cancer Society, and in-state domestic violence, drug, and legal aid programs). 
 60 As for ìplaintiffsí lawyer,î it has become generally recognized that consumer class 
actions are their products, not the nominal clients.  See, e.g., Issacharoff, supra note 32, at 
341 (ìClass actions almost invariably come into being through the actions of lawyersóin 
effect, it is the agents who create the principalsóand will not emerge without some 
protection of the entrepreneurial initiative of those lawyers.î).  As for ìbystanders,î the 
requirement that the nominal consumer plaintiffs must at least have purchased the 
product in question has been rejected explicitly in some cases.  For example, the class in 
Shaw v. Toshiba America Information Systems, Inc., included potential purchasers, who 
were found to have standing to obtain injunctive relief.  91 F. Supp. 2d 926, 938 (E.D. Tex. 
1999) (ì[I]t is not necessary for someone to actually own a defective computer in order to 
experience continuing, adverse effects from it.î).  The Shaw court affirmed standing 
ìregardless whether Plaintiffs currently own one of Defendantsí computers, are thinking 
about buying one of Toshibaís computers, or are commuting to work over a bridge with 
design specifications tainted by allegedly faulty [diskette controllers].î  Id. at 941.  From 
an ex ante perspective, this seemingly bizarre position is in fact quite plausible.  See 
Francesco Parisi & Jonathan Klick, Functional Law and Economics: The Search for 
Value-Neutral Principles of Lawmaking, 79 CHI.-KENT L. REV (forthcoming Winter 2004), 
available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=441941. 
 61 CAL. BUS. & PROF. CODE ß 17200 (Deering 1992 & Supp. 2003). 
 62 Id. (emphasis omitted). 
 63 See Stop Youth Addiction, Inc. v. Lucky Stores, Inc., 950 P.2d 1086, 1091 (Cal. 
1998). 
 64 See McCall et al., supra note 59, at 822ñ25 (discussing case law). 
 65 CAL. BUS. & PROF. CODE ß 17204 (Deering 1992 & Supp. 2003). 
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requirement is ìthat the plaintiff can effectively represent the 
[broader] groupís interests.î66  With respect to fraudulent 
business practices, for example, it is not necessary to show 
deception, reasonable reliance, or damages to anyone, let alone 
the plaintiff.67  Private enforcement may proceed even where the 
predicate statute manifestly contemplates no such thing.68  The 
procedural formalisms and due process safeguards of class 
actions, which from an ex ante perspective are deadweight at best 
and an invitation to opportunism at worst,69 have in fact 
disappeared under the UCL.  Actions on behalf of the public, 
sometimes called ìrepresentative actionsî or ìquasi-class 
actions,î may proceed without conforming to federal or state class 
action requirements.70  While private litigants may not sue for 
damages,71 they may obtain injunctive relief, as well as 
restitution and disgorgement under equitable principles.72  The 
California courts have created multiple vehicles to facilitate 
generous monetary relief.73  In short, ì[t]he only apparent 
limitation upon the practical reach of the UCL is the imagination 
of man (and woman).î74 
The best-known UCL plaintiff is Marc Kasky, a self-
proclaimed activist who sued Nike over the companyís allegedly 
false statements concerning its corporate practices in Third-
World countries.75  Mr. Kasky himself did not rely on those 
statementsóand certainly not to his detriment.  There was no 
evidence that he had ever purchased a Nike product; in any 
event, the companyís communications concerned its employment 
practices, not the attributes of its sneakers.76  Nonetheless, and 
 
 66 McCall et al., supra note 59, at 826. 
 67 Podolsky v. First Healthcare Corp., 58 Cal. Rptr. 2d 89, 98 (Cal. Ct. App. 1996). 
 68 See, e.g., Stop Youth Addiction, 950 P.2d at 1093; Consumers Union of U.S., Inc. v. 
Fisher Dev., Inc., 257 Cal. Rptr. 151, 155 (Cal. Ct. App. 1989). 
 69 For example, intra-class conflicts and hence inadequate representation of some 
subclass by a class attorney have greatly troubled the Supreme Court.  See Ortiz v. 
Fibreboard Corp., 527 U.S. 815, 856 (1999); Amchem Prods., Inc. v. Windsor, 521 U.S. 
591, 627-28 (1997).  The ex ante perspective, in contrast, pushes towards unified, 
mandatory class actions, which require a de facto surrender of the due process-based 
formalities of Rule 23(b).  David Rosenberg, Mandatory-Litigation Class Action: The Only 
Option for Mass Tort Cases, 115 HARV. L. REV. 831, 834, 840 (2002).  See also Rosenberg, 
Decoupling Deterrence and Compensation, supra note 41, at 1912 (class-action opt-out on 
grounds of plaintiff autonomy ìis a prescription for making everyone worse off.î). 
 70 See McCall et al., supra note 59, at 839. 
 71 Bank of the West v. Superior Court, 833 P.2d 545, 557 (Cal. 1992). 
 72 CAL. BUS. & PROF. CODE ß 17203 (Deering 1992 & Supp. 2003). 
 73 See generally McCall et al., supra note 59, at 826-49 (discussing forms of relief and 
case law). 
 74 Gail E. Lees, The Defense of Private and Governmental Unfair Competition Law 
Claims, 694 PRACTISING LAW INSTITUTE LITIGATION AND ADMINISTRATIVE PRACTICE 
COURSE HANDBOOK SERIES, UNFAIR COMPETITION CLAIMS 2003, at 261, 306 (2003). 
 75 Kasky v. Nike, Inc., 45 P.3d 243, 248 (Cal. 2002). 
 76 See id. 
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despite Nikeís vociferous First Amendment objections, the 
California Supreme Court permitted the case to go to trial.77  
After an unsuccessful petition to the United States Supreme 
Court,78 the case settled for a $1.5 million payment to a corporate 
watchdog group and Nike promised to mend its ways, both 
employment-wise and speech-wise.79 
One can think of Kasky v. Nike as the ultimate consumer 
class action ex ante.  The case conforms to that model in all 
essential respects except one: proponents of the ex ante model 
insist on a preclusive, res judicata effect on all possible 
claimants.80  (Quasi-class actions under the UCL generally lack 
such effects.)81  Alternatively, one can think of Kasky v. Nike as a 
kind of consumerist public law action for the production of a more 
ìrepublicanî globalization discourse that ought to proceed 
regardless of what millions of participants below the Sunsteinian 
margin may actually want to hear or say.82  At this point of 
perfect convergence, consumer law has reached its culmination. 
IV. RISKS OF A DUAL REGIME 
It would be silly to deny the deterrence and transaction cost 
problems that afflict the common law model.  It may even be true 
that those problems are particularly pronounced in the context of 
consumer transactions.  All that granted, a wholesale divestiture 
of legal claims from their common law owners begets other, 
potentially more vexing difficulties.  For example, an ex ante 
regime requires ancillary estoppel and preclusion rules that 
make good on the promise to get the deterrence level right.  What 
then are those rules?  Proponents of an ex ante regime, as noted, 
favor mandatory class actions and wholesale preclusion.83  That 
position raises serious due process concerns84 and numerous 
practical problemsóprominent among them, the specter that 
corporate defendants will cut themselves cheap, collusive 
 
 77 Id. at 262-63. 
 78 Nike v. Kasky, 123 S.Ct. 2554 (2003). 
 79 Lisa Girion, Nike Settles Lawsuit Over Labor Claims, L.A. Times, Sep. 13, 2003, at 
C1. 
 80 See Rosenberg, supra note 69, at 849 n.42. 
 81 See Fellmeth, supra note 24, at 1 & 11 n.4; Lees, supra note 74, at 449. 
 82 Professor Cass Sunstein has repeatedly urged the mobilization of ìpublic lawî for 
a ìrepublican discourse.î  See Cass R. SUNSTEIN, DEMOCRACY AND THE PROBLEM OF FREE 
SPEECH 39ñ43, 68ñ92 (1993).  Mercifully, Sunstein shrinks from the practical implications 
of his proposal.  See Stephen F. Williams, Background Norms in the Regulatory State, 58 
U. CHI. L. REV. 419, 427ñ29 (1991) (reviewing CASS R. SUNSTEIN, AFTER THE RIGHTS 
REVOLUTION: RECONCEIVING THE REGULATORY STATE (1990)).  More practical-minded 
individuals like Marc Kasky lack such inhibitions. 
 83 See Rosenberg, supra note 69, at 840-48. 
 84 See Ortiz v. Fibreboard Corp., 527 U.S. 815, 846-48 (1999). 
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settlements with a plaintiffsí lawyer of their choice.85  The 
problem appears in even sharper relief outside the context of 
Rule 23 and its formal protections for absent class members.86  
As noted, under Californiaís UCL, verdicts obtained by private 
litigants on behalf of the public have no preclusive effect (barring 
a preclusive judgment in a parallel class action).87  If they did, 
the statute would be facially unconstitutional since it would 
create a roving commission to dispose of the rights of absent, 
unnotified parties.88  But now, the due process problem appears 
at the other endóthe lack of preclusion raises the very real 
threat of multiple prosecutions and verdicts over the same 
violations by the same parties.89  This dilemma, which even the 
California courts have recognized,90 has no easy solution.91 
Similarly, the estimation of damages, restitution, or benefit-
of-the-bargain losses over a disparate class of consumers (outside 
the context of particularized injuries) poses considerable risks of 
judicial error.  Proponents of an ex ante model argue that liability 
awards are always a matter of statistics.92  Sophisticated survey 
and sampling techniques will reduce the room for error, and the 
elimination of confusing questions of causation or reliance will 
generate judicial economies of scale.93  But neither the empirical 
evidence nor practical considerations provide much support for 
such comforting assurances. 
 
 
 85 See Issacharoff, supra note 32, 381 n.152. 
 86 FED. R. CIV. P. 23(d)(4). 
 87 Fellmeth, supra note 24, at 1 & 11 n.4. 
 88 See Stop Youth Addiction, Inc. v. Lucky Stores, Inc., 950 P.2d 1086, 1106 (Cal. 
1998) (Baxter, J., concurring). 
 89 See In re N. Dist. of Cal. ìDalkon Shieldî IUD Prods. Liab. Litig., 526 F. Supp. 
887, 899 (N.D. Cal. 1981) (ìA defendant has a due process right to be protected against 
unlimited multiple punishment for the same act.î), vacated on other grounds, 693 F.2d 
847 (9th Cir. 1982).  See W. Union Tel. Co. v. Pennsylvania, 368 U.S. 71, 75 (1961) 
(recognizing that courtís failure to protect defendants from identical claims in other courts 
constitutes denial of due process). 
 90 See, e.g., Bronco Wine Co. v. Frank A. Logoluso Farms, 262 Cal. Rptr. 899, 911 
(Cal. Ct. App. 1989) (ìOne must question the utility of a procedure that results in a 
judgment that is not binding on the nonparty and has serious and fundamental due 
process deficiencies for parties and nonparties.î). 
 91 In dictum in Kraus v. Trinity Mgmt. Servs., Inc., 999 P.2d 718, 733 (Cal. 2000), the 
California Supreme Court suggested that courts might tackle the possibility of future 
suits by ìcondition[ing] payment of restitution . . . on execution of acknowledgement that 
the payment is in full settlement of claims against the defendant, thereby avoiding any 
potential for repetitive suits on behalf of the same persons or dual liability to them.î  Such 
an extra-statutory band-aid, however, would do nothing to preclude follow-on suits in 
cases where the defendant prevailed in the first case.  Moreover, it would do nothing to 
prevent plaintiffsí lawyer (and defendant) from disposing of the claims of members of the 
public, including actually injured parties, without any of the formal and due process 
protection of a class action. 
 92 Rosenberg, Decoupling Deterrence and Compensation, supra note 41, at 1893. 
 93 Id. 
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In the Avery litigation, the plaintiffsí expert estimated 
consequential losses (principally the cost of replacing the 
installed aftermarket parts with the original manufacturersí 
products) at anywhere between $658 million and $1.2 billion.94  
On cross-examination, he conceded that his high-end estimate 
might be off by about $1 billion.95  The benefit-of-the-bargain 
award in Price was, as noted, based on surveys of consumer 
averments of what they would have paid had they known the 
true nature of the product.96  The award is the difference between 
that hypothetical price and an allegedly promised ìsafeî 
cigaretteóby plaintiffsí own admission, a non-existent product.97  
We are nonetheless asked to believe that it is possible somehow 
to estimate a demand curve that slopes from here to there. 
The sorts of calculations that go into these awards treat the 
car buff who owns a vintage Chevy on a par with the owner of a 
run-of-the-mill vehicle with a previously dented fender.98  The 
latter may well be better off, both because the ìinferiorî 
replacement part is superior to the dented, pre-loss original and 
because he benefits as a repeat customer from State Farmís 
general aftermarket parts policy.  Likewise, the class in Price 
includes everyone from health-conscious nicotine addicts, who 
believed (however fantastically) that they were consuming a 
ìsafeî product, to the merely image-conscious who are under no 
such illusion and smoke Lights because they are socially more 
acceptable than in-your-face, filterless Camels.  In calculating 
the awards in Avery and Price, the courts made do with an 
expertís wild guess about the marginóand then effectively 
treated every claimant as a marginal purchaser.99  The ìmistakeî 
is hardly accidental.  First, the lack of direct evidence of the 
location of the margin or the distribution of claimants along the 
demand curve invites this kind of shortcut.100  Second, any 
serious consideration of the distributionóeven if only for 
purposes of assessing aggregate damagesówould tend to 
 
 94 Avery v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 746 N.E.2d 1242, 1260 (Ill. App. Ct. 
2001). 
 95 Id.  The court nonetheless characterized the expertís testimony as more than 
ìsheer speculation.î  Id. at 1261. 
 96 Price v. Philip Morris, Inc., No. 00-L-112, 2003 WL 22597608, at *14-16 (Ill. Cir. 
Ct. Mar. 21, 2003). 
 97 Id. at *15. 
 98 The vintage Chevy owner has suffered a genuine loss because both he and his 
potential customers can tell a replacement fender from the real thing. 
 99 See Avery, 746 N.E.2d at 1260; Price, 2003 WL 22597608, at *16. 
 100 Nor can one ascribe the ìmistakeî of treating customers (yet again and by means 
of a liability verdict) to the benefits of a bargain that they have already received to the 
parochial incentives of state trial judges.  For a federal appellate decision and opinion 
along these lines, by a judge who really should know better, see Desiano v. Warner-
Lambert Co., 326 F.3d 339 (2d Cir. 2003). 
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illustrate that the customers have practically nothing in common 
but the bare fact that they are customers.  A court that has 
slighted or sidestepped that reality at the class certification stage 
is unlikely to emphasize it at a later stage. 
Put those considerations aside and assume a world without 
transaction costs and, importantly, without judicial mistakes.  
Assume that common law or ex ante rules could both yield 
efficient results: it still does not follow that the conjunction and 
simultaneous operation of those two regimes also yields efficient 
results.  A system that bars recovery for non-injured consumers 
must offer full recovery for the marginal consumers who did rely 
to their detriment on the sellerís representations.  Conversely, an 
ex ante rule must bar additional claims for compensation as a 
form of ex post opportunism.  In real life, however, the regimes 
work in tandem. 
To revert to the case examples, the Williams class consists of 
all OxyContin purchasers for whom the product worked as 
intended but who claimed that the product, contrary to the 
companyís representations, proved addictive for some other 
consumers.101  Those others are specifically excluded from the 
class and remain free to sue over their alleged injuries regardless 
of the outcome of the Williams litigation.102  The Avery plaintiffs 
sued on their contract and under a state consumer-fraud 
statute.103  If inferior placement parts caused consequential 
damages for some class members (for example, by contributing to 
a second crash) those individuals remain free to bring suit 
against the manufacturer, installer, and presumably State Farm.  
The Price plaintiffs sued for misrepresentation, not bodily injury; 
Marlboro Lights smokers in Illinois remain free to bring product 
liability lawsuits.104  Under Californiaís Unfair Competition Law, 
verdicts and settlements in cases brought on behalf of the public 
do not preclude subsequent lawsuits against the same defendants 
over the same conduct by parties who are actually injured by the 
unlawful conduct (as well as those who are not).105 
 While one might say that ex ante and ex post  lawsuits 
deter different types of conduct (for example, the sale of a 
substandard product and fraudulent representations about it), 
one cannot easily separate the claims in this fashion.  In these 
cases, misrepresentations count for legal purposes only if they 
induce social losses and only because they produce them.  Why 
 
 101 Williams v. Purdue Pharma Co., 297 F. Supp. 2d 171, 172-73 (D.D.C. 2003). 
 102 Id. at 172. 
 103 Avery, 746 N.E.2d at 1247. 
 104 Price, 2003 WL 22597608, at *3. 
 105 Fellmeth, supra note 24, at 1 & 11 n.4. 
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else deter them?  Conversely, the defendantís misrepresentations 
are typically a crucial element in common law cases, for example, 
to defeat the ordinary defenses in contract and tort.  The plain 
fact is this: so long as the parties actually injured can sue, any 
additional deterrence is over the top.106  In allowing both types of 
suits (without one foreclosing the other), we do in fact have an ex 
ante rule and a common law rule operating on top of each other, 
over the same range of transactions. 
This dual regime has very nearly become a general norm.  
For example, voluminous federal and state regulations govern 
what manufacturers and service providers may and may not say 
about pharmaceutical drugs,107 tobacco products,108 warranties,109 
equity offerings,110 credit cards,111 and mortgage loans,112 among 
other products.  We also have general federal and state 
prohibitions against ìunfairî business practices, which are 
defined and enforced by the Federal Trade Commission and by 
state consumer protection agencies.113  These rules embody 
rough-and-ready judgments about the socially acceptable (if not 
exactly optimal) level of activity.  They prohibit conduct that 
would otherwise have to be deterred by means of litigation.  In 
other words, they are ex ante rules in legislative or 
administrative form.  However, only rarely do these rules have 
preclusive and preemptive effect.  For example, Marlboro Lights 
were sold in meticulous compliance with federal laws and 
regulations, but that fact failed to impress jurors and judges in 
Madison County, Illinois.114  Compliance defenses rarely succeed 
in liability lawsuits over ìunsafeî pharmaceutical drugs or 
automobiles.115  The risk is not simply confusion or incoherence: 
it is massive over-deterrence. 
 
 106 In re Bridgestone/Firestone, Inc., 288 F.3d 1012, 1017 (7th Cir.  2002) (ìIf tort law 
fully compensates those who are physically injured, then any recoveries by those whose 
products function properly mean excess compensation.î) (internal footnote omitted). 
 107 21 C.F.R. ß 202.1 (2003). 
 108 Federal Cigarette Labeling and Advertising Act, 15 U.S.C. ß 1331 (1993). 
 109 Magnuson-Moss Warranty Act, 15 U.S.C. ß 2302 (1998). 
 110 Truth in Lending Act, 15 U.S.C. ß 1601 (1998). 
 111 Truth in Lending Act, 15 U.S.C. ß 1637 (1998). 
 112 Home Mortgage Disclosure Act of 1975, 12 U.S.C. ß 2801 (1997). 
 113 Federal Trade Commission Act, 15 U.S.C. ß 45 (1991 & Supp. 2003); California 
Unfair Practices Act, CAL. BUS. & PROF. CODE ß 17200 (Deering 1992 & Supp. 2003). 
 114 Price v. Philip Morris, Inc., No. 00-L-112, 2003 WL 22597608, at *19 (Ill. Cir. Ct. 
Mar. 21, 2003) (rejecting defendantís claim under the Federal Cigarette Advertising and 
Labeling Act, 15 U.S.C. ß 1331). 
 115 See, e.g., Edwards v. Basel Pharm., 933 P.2d 298, 303 (Okla. 1997). 
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V. COMMON LAW AND CONSUMER LAW: CANíT WE HAVE ONE 
WITHOUT THE OTHER? 
Confident assertions about the efficiency of the common law 
often seem to founder on the manifest inefficiencies of what now 
passes for common law: would Judge Posner and his followers 
kindly explain the liability explosion?116  Without wishing to 
enter that messy and complicated debate, the preceding casual 
observation suggests that many of the actual or perceived 
problems stem, not from common law adjudication per se, but 
from its conjunction or interaction with legislative rules and 
interventions. 
It seems quite obviously the case that the common law may 
sua sponte go off the rails.  Multi-billion dollar verdicts in some 
product design defect cases are an example.117  Common law 
terms and doctrines, from ìnuisanceî to ìunconscionableî and, for 
that matter, ìinjury,î are sufficiently nebulous to sustain varying 
social and economic arrangements under a nominally unchanged 
doctrine.118  That openness creates a potential for efficient 
adaptation and for ideological flights of fancy.119 
Still, slides into wholesale nominalism are probably bound to 
be exceptions to the general practice.  At the end of the day, the 
common law embodies reciprocity relations that are real, not 
some theoretical construct.  Not everything can be a nuisance. 
My averred right to an unobstructed view is a prohibition on my 
neighborís right to expand his home, and that consideration will 
be obvious to the judge because the defendant will press it with 
some force.  Characterize anything but the literal truth as a 
ìmisrepresentationî and all advertising will cease; that intuition 
explains the continued viability of the distinction between 
actionable misrepresentation and permissible ìpuffery.î120  
 
 116 See, e.g., Robert D. Cooter & Daniel L. Rubinfeld, Economic Analysis of Legal 
Disputes and Their Resolution, 27 J. ECON. LITERATURE 1067, 1094 (1989), reprinted in 
ECONOMIC FOUNDATIONS OF PRIVATE LAW 173, 200 (Richard A. Posner & Francesco Parisi 
eds., 2002) (ì[A] decade of effort by economists to develop theories of tort law succeeded on 
its own scholarly terms, but economists all too often provided efficiency proofs for 
institutions that most lawyers now view as inefficient.î). 
 117 See, e.g., Ann W. OíNeill, 1999: The Year in Review, L.A. TIMES, Dec. 26, 1999, at 
B2 (discussing a jury award of 4.9 billion in damages against General Motors when a 1979 
Chevy Malibu burst into flames after being rear-ended by a drunk driver: the figure was 
later reduced by three billion dollars). 
 118 The textbook example is still Judge Skelly Wrightís wholesale transformation of 
ìunconscionabilityî in Williams v. Walker-Thomas Furniture Co., 350 F.2d 445 (D.C. Cir. 
1965). 
 119 See, e.g, George L. Priest, The New Scientism in Legal Scholarship: A Comment on 
Clark and Posner, 90 YALE L.J. 1284 (1981). 
 120 See, e.g., Charter Township of Ypsilanti v. Gen. Motors Corp., 506 N.W.2d 556, 
559, 561 (Mich. Ct. App. 1993). 
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Recognize anything as an ìinjuryî and it will soon transpire that 
nothing may be left to compensate actually injured victims.121  
Characterize as ìunconscionableî any sales practice or contract 
terms that might scandalize a middle-class consumer with secure 
credit (such as a federal judge) and it turns out that sales to low-
income, riskier customers dry up altogether.122  At some level, a 
common law judge must care about activity levels as well as 
harms; about production values as well as consumption; about 
over- as well as under-deterrence. 
So how does one strike a rough balance between these risks?  
The much-maligned common law requirements that circumscribe 
classes of plaintiffs and causes of actions, a starting point for the 
consumer law critique of the common law, can be understood as a 
kind of functional corollary or corrective to the inescapable 
vagueness of central substantive doctrines.  A negligent 
misrepresentation lies somewhere on a spectrum between fraud 
at one end and an innocent effort to package consumer 
information at the other, which can be done only by omitting 
some information that is known to the seller.  In cases alleging 
misrepresentation, there are substantial costs to erring on either 
side.   
The common law must find a rough balance.  On the one 
hand, the legal defenses that sound in tort (which are the third 
and last line of defense against abuse and exploitation, well 
behind the competitive discipline of the market and contractual 
defenses) must be given their proper real-world context to avoid 
the threat of under-deterrence.  On the other hand, the threat of 
over-deterrence created by inflated loss allegations must be 
avoided by limiting the universe of cases to those where the 
losses are concretely visible.  In these cases, detrimental reliance 
ensures that the plaintiff before the court is actually the 
marginal consumer whose losses are far more ascertainable than 
the infra-marginal classís estimates of losses to someone else.123 
Reciprocity-based inhibitions tend to give way when the 
legislature signals an intention to promote consumer interests 
and consumption values.  Presumably (judges surmise), a 
legislature that enacts a consumer protection statute wants to do 
more than to codify pre-existing law.  Thus, courts may loosen 
injury requirements and adopt more relaxed notions of 
inducement and reliance even where the text of the statute 
 
 121 See Metro-N. Commuter R.R. Co. v. Buckley, 521 U.S. 424, 435-36 (1997) (asbestos 
litigation). 
 122 See Richard A. Epstein, Unconscionability: A Critical Reappraisal, 18 J.L. & 
ECON. 293, 305 (1975). 
 123 I owe the point to Richard Epstein. 
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leaves some doubt about the legislatureís intent to prompt that 
judicial response.  Courts, one might say, act on what they take 
to be the legislatureís signals, rather than following its 
affirmative commands. 
This broad-brush description captures the state judiciariesí 
response to the enactment of ìlittle FTC actsî and analogous 
consumer protection statutes passed by many states in the late 
1950s and 1960s.  For the most part, those state enactments 
sought to strengthen the hand of public regulators and 
prosecutors (foremost, the consumer protection offices of state 
attorneys general) in enforcing prohibitions against unfair 
competition, false advertising, and the like.124  Like the FTC 
itself, state agencies generally enjoy broad discretion in defining 
ìunfairî or ìdeceptiveî practices.125  Typically, public agencies are 
not required to prove all the common law elements of statutory 
offenses, for example, detrimental reliance by individual 
consumers.126  This arrangement makes a good deal of sense: let 
individual consumers sue over direct harms, and let public 
prosecutors, whose abuses can be checked by political and 
budgetary means, direct their attention to ìfraud on the marketî 
offenses that are likely to be under-deterred through private 
litigation. 
Over time though, many state courts came to read those 
statutes as a warrant for more expansive private litigation.127  
The train of thought is not hard to follow: the legislatorsí 
enhanced authorization of public prosecutors looks to all eyes like 
an endorsement of consumer interests outside the confines and 
strictures of the common law.128  When private plaintiffs 
subsequently sue on those more expansive theories, they are 
 
 124 See Sovern, Reconsidering, supra note 28, at 448 (ìThe state statutes, like the FTC 
Act, typically grant enormous power to the public agencies which enforce them . . . .î). 
 125 Jean Braucher, Delayed Disclosure in Consumer E-Commerce as an Unfair and 
Deceptive Practice, 46 WAYNE L. REV. 1805, 1807 (2000). 
 126 Agencies, both federal and state, need not even allege or show that a 
ìmisrepresentationî was false.  See, e.g., FTC v. Sterling Drugs, Inc., 317 F.2d 669, 674 
(2d Cir. 1963) (ì[P]roof of intention to deceive is not requisite to a finding of violation of 
the statute . . . .î); Bockenstette v. FTC, 134 F.2d 369, 371 (10th Cir. 1943) (ìIt is not 
necessary . . . for the Commission to find that actual deception resulted.î); FTC v. Balme, 
23 F.2d 615, 621 (2d Cir. 1928) (ìNor is it necessary . . . to find . . . that any competitor of 
the respondent has been damaged.î).  See also Sovern, Reconsidering, supra note 28, at 
444-45, 450-51. 
 127 See Seth William Goren, A Pothole on the Road to Recovery: Reliance and Private 
Class Actions Under Pennsylvaniaís Unfair Trade Practices and Consumer Protection 
Law, 107 DICK. L. REV. 1, 13-14 (2002) (collecting cases and commentary). 
 128 See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Monumental Props., Inc., 329 A.2d 812, 822 (Pa. 1974) 
(We cannot presume that the Legislature when attempting to control unfair and deceptive 
practices . . . intended to be strictly bound by common-law formalisms.  Rather the more 
natural inference is that the Legislature intended the Consumer Protection Law to be 
given a pragmatic reading . . . .î). 
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hardly acting contrary to the statutory intent; they are merely 
assisting resource-strapped public agencies. 
In the 1970s (the heyday of the consumer law movement), 
state legislatures made the next move and provided explicitly for 
the private enforcement of consumer protection statutes.129  Most 
states also provided added incentives for private litigation, 
typically in the form of attorneysí fees and treble damages for 
certain violations.130  While federal courts sought to limit the 
reach of expansive state statutes (for example, through broad 
preemption under the Federal Arbitration Act),131 judicial 
responses among the states appear to have varied greatly.  In 
some states, courts limited what they viewed as the scope of 
private consumer litigation, often by means of reading common 
law requirements of inducement, reliance, and injury into the 
statutes.132  However, in most other cases the state judiciary 
accepted the legislatureís invitation to give free rein to private 
enforcers.133 
California provides a dramatic illustration of judicial 
creativity in expanding the reach of the Unfair Competition Act.  
In particular, the creation of universal standing in Barquis v. 
Merchants Collection Association of Oakland, Inc.134 was quite 
plainly neither intended nor anticipated by the legislature.135  
These differences in institutional agenda-setting and legal 
development would make an interesting study for political 
scientists.  Of greater practical import though, is the near-
uniform tendency toward greatly expanded private consumer 
litigation. 
That tendency is readily explained.  In the area of consumer 
law, as in many other venues, legislatures and courts act as 
competing suppliers of substantially identical goods.  Naturally, 
the demand for consumer law will gravitate towards the more 
favorable forum.  The default outcome is that an expansion of 
 
 129 See Sovern, Reconsidering, supra note 28, at 448. 
 130 Id. at 448-49. 
 131 See Allied-Bruce Terminix Cos. v. Dobson, 513 U.S. 265, 281 (1995); Southland 
Corp. v. Keating, 465 U.S. 1, 16 (1984).  See also Williams v. Purdue Pharma Co., 297 F. 
Supp. 2d 171, 174, 177 (D.D.C. 2003) (dismissing consumer complaint for lack of injury 
despite statutory language authorizing ìany personî to seek redress for illegal trade 
practices); Bullet Golf, Inc. v. U.S. Golf Assín, No. CV-94-4182-ER, 1995 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 
6189, at *2 (C.D. Cal. Mar. 20, 1995) (dismissing claim under California FAA without 
credible allegation of actual deception and injury). 
 132 See, e.g., Heidt v. Potamkin Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc., 354 S.E.2d 440, 441 (Ga. Ct. 
App. 1987) (requiring reliance); Goren, supra note 127, at 32 (discussing and criticizing 
Pennsylvania Supreme Courtís decision to that effect); Sovern, supra note 28, at 457-60. 
 133 See Goren, supra note 127, at 13-14. 
 134 496 P.2d 817, 839 (Cal. 1972). 
 135 Stop Youth Addiction, Inc. v. Lucky Stores, Inc., 950 P.2d 1086, 1107-09 (Cal. 
1998) (Brown, J., dissenting) (discussing statutory text and history). 
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consumer law occurs so long as both or either institution say 
ìyes.î  It can be avoided only if both say ìno,î or else the nay-
saying institution affirmatively refuses to cooperate and then 
presumes and exercises the authority to rein in the wayward 
rival. 
Such a scenario is barely thinkable.  Theoretically, state 
courts could, within the limits of their state constitution, refuse 
to apply statutes in derogation of common law requirements.  
Theoretically, legislatures could repeal private enforcement 
provisions or judicial decisions to that effect.  Neither courts nor 
legislatures, however, are any good at this sort of thing.  Both 
confront great institutional obstacles even in reversing their own 
decisions, let alone the decisions of a coordinate branch of 
government.  Litigation under Californiaís Unfair Competition 
Law has spawned sufficient abuse and distress to prompt 
stopgap interventions by the office of the attorney general.136  It 
has also prompted reform proposals by a reform commission that 
included prominent members of the plaintiffsí bar137 and a legal 
scholar with impeccable consumer advocacy credentials.138  Still, 
the California Supreme Court has emphatically declined 
opportunities to curtail the scope of the statute.139  The 
Sacramento legislature, for its part, has proven a graveyard for 
reform proposals.140 
VI. CONCLUSION 
As legal doctrines change, so do institutional and interest 
group arrangements.  The loosening of common law requirements 
in the 1970s had the intended result of facilitating consumer 
 
 136 Attorney General Bill Lockyer filed suit against a Beverly Hills law firm under the 
same Unfair Competition Law that the firm was accused of abusing.  Press Release, Office 
of the Attorney General, Attorney General Lockyer Files ì17200î Consumer Protection 
Lawsuit Against Beverly Hills Law Firm (Feb. 26, 2003), available at 
http://caag.state.ca.us/newsalerts/2003/03-021.htm. 
 137 Unfair Competition Litigation, 26 CAL. L. REVISION COMMISSION REPS. 191 (1996). 
 138 See Fellmeth, supra note 24, at 1.  Professor Fellmeth has a long and 
distinguished record as a consumer law advocate. 
 139 See, e.g., Stop Youth Addiction, 950 P.2d at 1115 (Brown, J., dissenting) (observing 
that ìthe Courts of Appeal have done an admirable job of reining in the UCLís potential 
for adverse regulatory effectsî and charging the majority with ìchoos[ing] to speed us 
along the path to perdition.î). 
 140 In point of fact, the California legislature has repeatedly expanded the reach of the 
UCL, typically in response to limiting judicial rulings.  See, e.g., CAL. BUS. & PROF. CODE 
ß 17203 (Deering 1992 & supp. 2004) (reversing Mangini v. Aerojet-General Corp., 230 
Cal. App. 3d 1125, 1156 (1991)); State v. Texaco, Inc., 762 P.2d 385, 399 (1988) (holding 
that the statute only applies to wrongful business practices).  In light of the legislatureís 
resistance, business-backed reform advocates now propose reform by means of an 
initiative and referendum.  See STOP $hakedown Lawsuits, Californians to Stop 
$hakedown Lawsuits, http://www.stopshakedownlawsuits.com/ (last visited Mar. 4, 2004). 
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litigation by public interest organizations and legal aid groups.141  
In retrospect, the dominance of that form of litigation has proven 
temporary.  Consumer law has long since slipped its 
constituency-oriented moorings.  It now responds to the demands 
of lone rangers and, far more importantly, the class action bar. 
Strikingly, the role of consumer protection statutes has 
attracted very little attention in the public, political, or academic 
debate over ìtort reform.î  Perhaps this is because billion dollar 
verdicts in ìmisrepresentationî cases are of somewhat more 
recent vintage than older, yet equally spectacular, product 
liability cases.  Perhaps the business community prefers a 
unifying agenda, such as a campaign against punitive damages 
(which every corporation opposes) to an agenda that would 
require a partial surrender of tactical opportunities.  Like many 
unfair competition laws, Californiaís statute permits business 
firms to sue their competitors, and the stateís leading tort reform 
group has insisted that these opportunities must be preserved in 
reforming the statute.142  Also, state legislators quite probably 
have an incentive to pretend that the ìliability crisisî is 
altogether the fault of an out-of-control judiciary.  Scholars 
continue to teach Torts and Contracts without much attention to 
peripheral interferences from consumer protection statutes.143 
The obvious problem is that the periphery has long begun to 
overwhelm the common law center.  I seriously doubt that one 
could find many contemporary class action cases of any 
consequence where a conventional fraud or breach of contract 
claim is not accompanied by a statutory claim of unfairness, 
deception, or misrepresentation.144 The less obvious and more 
challenging problem is the conjunction and interaction of 
disparate theories of enforcement and recovery.  A theory of 
misrepresentation without reliance, inducement, and injury may 
make a certain amount of sense in the context of a public 
enforcement monopoly.  However, wrenched out of that context, 
 
 141 Stewart Macaulay, Bambi Meets Godzilla: Reflections on Contracts Scholarship 
and Teaching vs. State Unfair and Deceptive Trade Practices and Consumer Protection 
Statutes, 26 HOUS. L. REV. 575, 583 (1989) (ìLegal services programs have brought many 
of the reported cases.î). 
 142 See John H. Sullivan, Californiaís Notorious ì17200îóWritten by Lewis Carroll, 
Adapted by Stephen King?, Remarks at the Meeting of the Center for Legal Policy at the 
Manhattan Institute and the Federation of Defense and Corporate Counsel (Oct. 24, 
2002), transcript available at http://www.cjac.org/bp17200/. 
 143 Macaulay, supra note 141, at 575-76. 
 144 In three case examples discussed above, plaintiff sued under state fraud and 
unfair competition statutes.  See supra, notes 42, 47 & 51 and accompanying text.  
Additionally, the Toshiba case was brought under the federal Computer Fraud and Abuse 
Act of 1986, 18 U.S.C. ß 1030.  Shaw v. Toshiba Am. Info. Sys., Inc., 91 F. Supp. 2d 926 
(E.D. Tex. 1999). 
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it becomes profoundly problematic.  Benefit-of-the-bargain 
redress makes eminent sense in a common law case over a 
breach of contract, but out of that context, it may turn into a 
menace.  Yet, for perfectly understandable institutional reasons, 
what we have is a dual, overlapping regime. 
I do not profess to know whether it is possible to unscramble 
this particular omelet.  One can think of partial steps in that 
directionófor example, a sharper distinction between public and 
private enforcers, or an expansion of affirmative compliance 
defenses.  The former strategy would confine common law and ex 
ante rules to their respective domains; the latter would force a 
social choice between the two.  It may be too late or too early in 
the day to contemplate such steps.  Too late because the 
privatization of public law norms, unhinged from requirements of 
injury, is a fait accompli sustained by a seamless coalition of 
consumer advocates and plaintiffsí attorneys.  Too early because 
common law modes of thought continue to exert a powerful pull 
on our collective imagination. 
To their credit, the most articulate proponents of an ex ante 
regime emphatically proffer their scheme as an alternative to 
common law modes of thought, not as a supplement.145  They 
have been at pains to insist that public regulatory schemes are 
often superior to, and ought to preclude, private litigation.146  
Their clarion call is efficiency, not some boundless ideological 
conception of  ìconsumer rights.î147  Precisely this convergence of 
efficiency theorems and consumerist nostrums ought to give 
pause, and, after a deep breath, call attention to the political 
economy of the beast.  One may dismiss notions of plaintiff 
autonomy and the individualís right to a day in court as so much 
sentimental nonsense and ex post opportunism.148  The fact is 
that the sentimentalists and opportunists will continue to vote, 
litigate, and agitate in defiance of elegant blackboard schemes.  
The siren song of consumer law in its modern, disembodied state 
is precisely that everyone should have a day in court, injured or 
not.  To show that this bastard regime cannot be efficient from 
any perspective is the easy part.  The hard part is to tie ourselves 
 
 145 FRIED & ROSENBERG, supra note 39, at 14 (ìCrucially, ex ante and ex post 
preferences are mutually exclusive concerning the fundamental purpose of the legal 
system in managing accident risk.î). 
 146 Id. at 66-67; Rosenberg, Decoupling Deterrence and Compensation, supra note 41, 
at 1918-19 (ì[T]he general, well-documented advantages of these ìalternativesî dictate 
resorting to courts only to the extent of systematic failure of administrative regulation to 
control risk appropriately and of government and commercial first-party insurers to cover 
loss adequately.î). 
 147 FRIED & ROSENBERG, supra note 39, at 13. 
 148 Rosenberg, Decoupling Deterrence and Compensation, supra note 41, at 1911-16. 
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to one mast or the other. 
